In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) the existence of malicious nodes is a serious challenge. Malicious nodes increase the traffic by sending distrusted messages. In this paper, we present CCTF: a congestion control protocol based on trustworthiness of nodes in WSNs using fuzzy logic. Through the use of CCTF, each node reduces malfunctioning neighbour(s) effects via dropping valueless packets and increases the buffer capacity; consequently, the chance of network congestion reduces. Simulation results show that when 16% of all nodes are malicious, CCTF increases the packet delivery ratio up to 40% meanwhile it reduces the packet drop ratio nearly 27.5%.
Introduction
Embedded sensor and actuator-based systems have the potential to provide an inexpensive and pervasive bridge between the physical and computational worlds. Such WSNs have found applications in target field imaging; intrusion detection; weather monitoring; security and tactical surveillance; distributed computing; and in the detection of ambient conditions such as temperature, movement, sound and light (Mohamed and Sesh, 2008) .
A WSN consists of large number of sensor nodes which are small in size and have limited processing capabilities and energy resources (Munir et al., 2007) . These nodes are usually static and deployed arbitrarily in a region. Their purpose is to gather information from their environment and transmit the sensed data to base stations without any preconfigured infrastructures. This cooperation, especially in far-distance applications and monitored areas, enables users to receive intended information, access new events and make proper decisions on them. The position of sensor nodes need not be engineered or predetermined. This allows random deployment in inaccessible terrains or disaster relief operations. On the other hand, this also means that sensor network protocols and algorithms must possess self-organising capabilities (Zhiying et al., 2005) .
WSNs introduce several technical challenges (She and Yeow, 2006) . Some of the most important issues are related to extracting useful, trustful and timely information from the deployed sensor network, and include distributed information processing and data fusion (Yonghe and Sajal, 2006) . In networks, data processing is defined as the processing that the network nodes carry out on data in a distributed manner. The process is performed while data are exchanged, i.e., before they are acquired and used by the higher layers. Such distributed processing could have several advantages for WSNs (Alessandro et al., 2007) .
Computation is typically much less energy consuming than communication. In fact, on a power constrained sensor, one of the goals is reducing the traffic as much as possible by exploiting the high redundancy and correlation that is normally present in sensor data. Moreover, degrading congestion phenomena via strong nodes with in-network data processing ability as distributed duties and powering them to make proper decisions on received packets from detected sudden events instead of blind forwarding, is one of the other goals. Sending one bit requires almost the same amount of energy as executing 50-150 instructions (Alessandro et al., 2007) . Hence, sensor nodes commonly operate under light interaction in standby behaviour and suddenly become active due to un-predictable bursts of messages triggered by external events that should be sensed or monitored. This can result in generation of large, sudden and correlated impulses of data by multiple nodes that must be diffused to a small number of sinks through the same channels at a time without significantly disrupting the performance of the sensing application. But with congestion phenomenon network throughput degrades and results in rise of packet loss because of buffer overflow and increased delays and energy loss of nodes. Although a WSN may spend only a small fraction of time dealing with congestion phenomenon, it is during this time that the information it delivers is of greatest importance (Majid, 2007; Faisal et al., 2008) .
Moreover, in-network data processing increases robustness of each node and causes clear behaviour to achieve reliable and trustworthy interaction between sensor nodes. Sensor nodes may be prone to malfunctioning naturally, therefore, improvement of robustness and better resource utilisation should be considered in designing sensor nodes. While remote asset monitoring and control does improve operation efficiency, use of distrusted data from malfunctioning sensor nodes in critical applications can have disastrous consequences (Zarei et al., 2009) .
It is noticeable that existing congestion control solutions do not consider trusted interaction between nodes, while diffused useless packets of distrusted nodes may aggravate congestion problems. Moreover, the majority of existing trust solutions use negotiating packets for investigating the behaviour of a suspicious node, while some of these packets may be lost due to buffer overflow. Therefore, our new scheme gives each node more ability to estimate the trustworthiness of the neighbours individually. There is no need for the nodes to negotiate with each other and each node makes the appropriate decision on forwarding received packets locally in order to reduce packet loss ratio when the congestion phenomenon occurs.
In this paper we extend our previous study, simulation areas and results (Zarei et al., 2009) and we look at applying the in-network data processing; a fuzzy based trust estimation for congestion control in WSNs. Our proposed scheme removes the traffic ratio overhead of handling packets associated with corrupt and malfunctioning nodes which can be interpreted as malicious nodes. This paper is organised as follows: related works are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 describes fuzzy logic while Section 4 illustrates the proposed fuzzy based trust estimation for congestion control. Section 5 reports simulation and results and, finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related works
Different congestion control schemes in WSN have been previously studied with and without the use of fuzzy logic. These works may address the congestion control solutions for sensor networks by building a trust model to measure the trustworthiness in WSN. Munir et al. (2007) presents a fuzzy-logic based mechanism to efficiently sort out traffic and minimise the packet loss for prioritised event-driven traffic. Akkaya and Younis (2003) present an energy-aware QoS routing protocol for sensor networks which can run efficiently with best-effort traffic. The proposed model classifies traffic on the basis of real-time and non-real time application data. ESRT (Yogesh et al., 2003) allocates transmission rate to sensors such that an application-defined number of sensor readings are received at a base station, while ensuring the network is not congested. On reception of packets with congestion notification bit high, sink node regulates the reporting rate by broadcasting a high energy control signal so that it could reach to all sources. CODA (Chieh et al., 2003) uses a combination of the present and past channel loading conditions and the current buffer occupancy, to infer accurate detection of congestion at each receiver with low cost. As long as a node detects congestion, it sends backpressure messages to upstream nodes for controlling reporting rate hop-by-hop. PSFQ (Wan et al., 2005 ) is a scalable and reliable transport protocol that deals with strict data delivery guarantees rather than desired event reliability as it is done in ESRT. However, this approach involves highly specialised parameter tuning and accurate timing configuration that makes it unsuitable for many applications. RMST (Stann and Heidemann, 2003 ) is a transport layer paradigm designed to complement directed diffusion (Intanagonwiwat et al., 2003) by adding a reliable data transport service on top of it. It's a NACK based protocol which has primarily timer driven loss detection and repair mechanisms. It does not provide with any congestion control mechanism. TARA (Kang et al., 2007) discusses the network hotspot problem and presents a topology aware resource adaptation strategy to alleviate congestion in sensor network. To reduce packet loss and achieve a fair delivery ratio (Mamun-Or-Rashid et al., 2007) propose a source count based Hierarchical Medium Access Control (HMAC) and Weighted Round Robin Forwarding (WRRF). HMAC ensures a hierarchical access of the medium according to the source count value. While WRRF assigns a weighted share of packet delivery to the downstream node. These two schemes together greatly reduce media contention and thereby congestion due to collision. Congestion due to buffer overflow is completely avoided.
Even though all these mentioned studies attempt to reduce the network traffic and ensure good delivery ratio, they all assume a trustworthy environment and reliable interactions without considering presence of malfunctioning nodes. Malfunctioning nodes contribute to increasing traffic ratio by diffusing useless packets.
Evaluating the performance of the fuzzy based trusted Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol in Ad hoc networks with varying numbers of malicious nodes is proposed by Manickam and Shanmugavel (2007) . Our scheme proposes fuzzy based trust estimation compatible with sensor networks and independent of routing protocols. Zhiying explores a distributed trust model, enabling recommendation-based trust and trust-based recommendation to build a reasonable trust relationship among WSN (Zhiying et al., 2005 (Zhiying et al., , 2006 (Zhiying et al., , 2008 . Mohammad and Subhash (2008) represent a new approach to calculating trust between sensor nodes based on their sensed data and the reported data from surrounding nodes. It addresses the trust issue from continuous sensed data, and this is different from all other approaches which address the issue from the communications and binary point of view (Mohammad and Subhash, 2008) . These approaches are not good enough for sensor networks with high traffic ratio and may provoke congestion problems because of the diffusion of reported data from neighbour nodes. On the other hand these negotiated packets may be lost because of buffer overflow.
Fuzzy logic
Fuzzy logic is much closer in spirit to human thinking and natural language than the traditional logical systems. Basically, it provides an effective means of capturing the approximate, inexact nature of the real world. Viewed in this perspective, the essential part of the Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) is a set of linguistic control rules related by the dual concepts of fuzzy implication and the compositional rule of inference (Lee, 1990) . Some advantages of fuzzy logic are: it is conceptually easy to understand, flexible and tolerant of imprecise data, it has the ability to model non-linear functions of arbitrary complexity, and the ability to be built on top of the experience of experts and, finally, the ability to be blended with conventional control techniques based on natural language (Mirabedini et al., 2008) .
According to Figure 1 , the FIS is composed of four main components (Essam et al., 2008; Feng et al., 2007) : the Fuzzification module, the Rule Base module, the Inference Mechanism module and, finally, the Defuzzification interface module. The Fuzzification interface performs the function of fuzzification by converting input data into suitable linguistic values which may be viewed as labels of fuzzy sets. The Inference Mechanism is the kernel of a FIS; it has the capability of simulating human decision making based on fuzzy concepts and applies a predetermined set of linguistic rule in the Rule Base with respect to these linguistic variables, and produces fuzzy outputs. The Rule Base comprises knowledge of the application domain and the attendant control goals. It consists of a data base and a linguistic fuzzy control rule base. The Defuzzification performs a scale mapping, which converts the range of values of output variables into corresponding universes of discourse. can have destructive consequences. Our novel scheme proposes a proactive behaviour-based trust estimation which guarantees that only useful received packets are accepted even if one, or a group of, neighbour nodes misbehave.
Misbehaviour analyses for detecting suspicious nodes
In sensor networks, nodes have to cooperate with each other to perform network functions. Nodes which are selfish and drop the received packets or re-forward them several times have to be disclosed and isolated as malicious. Therefore, in terms of dealing with received packets, each node should consider its neighbour's interaction behaviour and find a neighbour or group of neighbours that are malfunctioning on the received packets. We classify node's malfunctioning in packet forwarding into three types: Number, Delay and Validity. It is noticeable that both routing and data packets can be generally affected by misbehaviour. The first two types have been reported in earlier studies (Zhiying et al., 2005 (Zhiying et al., , 2006 (Zhiying et al., , 2008 . However, unlike the proposed models we do not consider 'jury' nodes with negotiation being decision based. Our novel scheme deals with the congestion problem; therefore, using negotiation and voting methods for detecting malicious nodes some related packet may be lost.
In the rest of this section we describe these three misbehaviour interaction in detail:
• Number: Suspected nodes may drop the intended packets unintentionally or re-forward duplicated packets several times without considering tracing parameters of network or suitable timeout.
With N P , Number can be computed by neighbours of a suspected node as:
In which N f is the number of packets that the suspected node forwards after receiving it and N ef is the number of packets that the sensor node expects its suspect neighbour of forwarding after receiving them.
• Delay: Extracting useful and timely information from the deployed nodes plays a crucial role in a sensor network. Timing misbehaviour is a problem through which a malicious node delays packet forwarding. Therefore, packets Time-To-Live (TTL) expire. Moreover, packets may be forwarded with short delay being even shorter than usual. In this case a malicious node receives a packet, forwards it blindly without considering and processing the packet about duplicative and legitimacy attributes and suitable transmission rate according to network traffic. D P computes Delay as:
In which T r is defined as the delay with which the suspected node forwards packet after receiving it and T a is the delay that a node expects its suspect neighbour node to forward the packet after receiving it.
• Validity: Suspected nodes send packets into network where a considerable number of them could be practically not valid or be unknown for other neighbour nodes in terms of contents. Indeed, validity misbehaviour could possibly occur during modification and fabrication. Therefore, V p shows Validity as:
In which N v is the number of valid packets forwarded by the suspected node and N vf is the number of packets forwarded by suspected node.
Trust verification with fuzzy systems
Each node estimates the related trust of its neighbour nodes based on the following procedure.
Fuzzification interface
The fuzzification comprises the process of transforming crisp (non-fuzzy) values into grades of membership for linguistic terms of fuzzy sets. The membership functions (MFs) are used to associate a grade to each linguistic term. Fuzzy inputs MFs are depicted in Figure 2 Figure 2 (a). Linguistic value of M interpreted that the number of forwarded packets is acceptable and operation of node is normal. H and VH show that the number of forwarded packets by related neighbour node is more and much more than usual, respectively. On the other hand L and VL show that related neighbour node stop re-forwarding some of received packets.
In Figure 2 
Equation (5) performs scale mapping for D P and changes universes discourse in fuzzification phase. Related MFs are depicted in Figure 2 (b). The linguistic value of M means that delay is equal to expected delay and the neighbour node interactions are acceptable. The linguistic value of H shows that related neighbour node, delay forwarding all packets while VH is interpreted as longest delay. Moreover, L and VL show that delay is shorter than normal delay. When linguistic value is VH; majority of forwarded packets are useful and operation of suspected node is normal. In contrast when linguistic value is VL, a huge majority of forwarded packets are useless. MFs of buffer capacity are depicted in Figure 2 (d). VH is interpreted as if at least 70% of the buffer is empty. VL shows that at most 30% of buffer is empty.
Inference Mechanism based on rules
The 'Inference Mechanism' applies a predetermined set of linguistic rules and produces fuzzy trust value. MFs of trust are explained in Figure 2 (e). VH shows trust is very high, while M indicates that trust is medium and linguistic value of VL is interpreted trust as very low.
The 'Rule Bases' of evaluator for using in Inference Mechanism are shown in Table 1 . In terms of detecting malicious nodes which may misbehave on Number, Delay or Validity of forwarded packets; N Fp , D Fp or V Fp will be used as first input respectively. B f will be used as second input which shows current capacity of evaluator node. Evaluated trust for N Fp and D Fp are similar. 
Defuzzification interface
The 'Defuzzification interface' performs a scale mapping, which converts the range of fuzzified trust into the corresponding non-fuzzy form. Inferred fuzzy trust values are converted to corresponding non-fuzzy values in the range of {2, 3, 4, …, 10}, in which '10' is definitely interpreted as a legitimate node. With declining in value, it can be interpreted that related nodes tend to misbehave more and more and, finally, '2' is interpreted as a malicious node.
Modelling fuzzy based trust estimation and controlling congestion problem
The operation of CCTF is summarised in Figure 3 . In order to detect behaviour of each neighbour node, The Fuzzy Input Parameter Extraction (FIPE) processes the packets stored in buffer and generates analytical metrics for Number, Delay and Validity according to equation (1)- (3) for each node's packets. This prepared information is sent to Fuzzy Logic Controller (FLC). The current capacity of buffer is also sent to FLC. FLC analyses each neighbour in fuzzy form based on predetermined rules by following procedure. As shown in Figure 3 for detecting misbehaviour on number, delay or validity of forwarded packets of suspected node, FIS 1 , FIS 2 and FIS 3 will be run, respectively, in serial form. Therefore, if FIS 1 accepts the calculated trust for Number of a neighbour node's packets, then the FIS 2 will run. After that, FIS 3 will execute if FIS 2 obtains an acceptable trust for Delay checking. Therefore, the neighbour node is a legitimate node if FIS 3 confirms it as final inference for Validity analysis. At the end of each inference if the calculated trust is lower than Threshold Trust Value (TTV), procedure will stop and next inference system will not be executed. Based on this information FLC suggests a trust value for all neighbours of the node to the Trust Verification and Drop Decision (TVDD) module. Therefore, TVDD decides whether to block a neighbour or trust it based on reported trust. A neighbour is legitimate and trusted if its suggested trust value is equal or larger than the preferred TTV. Depending on packet loss ratio TTV can change dynamically. Therefore, TVDD periodically updates the information about the current traffic ratio to improve the control on congestion problem and reports new TTV to FLC. 
Simulation and results
Network Simulator NS-2 (Breslau et al., 2000) has been used to simulate WSN. We have generated all scenarios 1000 times. 500 nodes were randomly scattered and the Directed Diffusion routing protocol was used. DD is a data-centric routing protocol that uses only local interaction between neighbour nodes (Intanagonwiwat et al., 2003) . In all simulations we assumed that the congestion problem occurs and that some packets will be lost because of buffer overflow. Therefore, DD is suitable for our scenarios and needs no global information. All Simulation parameters are listed in Table 2 . Different scenarios were simulated in the presence of different malfunctioning types for nodes such as Number, Delay or Validity. In addition, variable numbers of malicious nodes were considered. Monte Carlo simulating of different scenarios reported that scattering the malicious nodes in critical and dense regions with maximal neighbour nodes severely influences the network performance, increasing the network congestion problem. Using fuzzy based scheme, suitable trust value will be addressed to each neighbour based on number, delay and validity of packets that are expected to be forwarded. Table 1 , inferred fuzzy trust value belongs to MF with linguistic value of LL from Figure 2 (e). LL will be converted to amount of '2' after defuzzification. The other malicious node misbehaviour is number type; N Fp belongs to MF of L (Figure 2(a) ) and it means that the related node does not forward about half of the expected packets. B f belongs to MF of M, therefore inferred trust is ML and is in the non-fuzzy form of '5'. In order to reduce handling traffic, the related packets of these two malicious nodes were dropped by using CCTF. It should be noted that each malicious node may perform single or multiple malfunctioning, However, based on FLC structure, by detecting the first malfunctioning type, the suspected node will be blocked. The other neighbour nodes were assessed as legitimate, with the obtained acceptable trust values.
Figure 4
Evaluated trust value by node for its neighbours using fuzzy based scheme Figure 5 shows a typical trust diagram of a malicious node which misbehaved in the number of forwarded packets. In different times, the inferred variable trust value by fuzzified neighbours of this malicious node indicates that the number of forwarded packets is unacceptable and operation of the node is unstable. Sometimes the suspected node which, here, acts as one of the intermediate nodes, forwards the received packets towards the sink. By contrast, in other times, the suspected node does not cooperate in forwarding received packets or re-forward duplicative packets more than usual. This suggests that this node cannot be considered as legitimate and has been used in collective cooperation. We defined 16% of all nodes as malicious. It is noticeable that in each defined scenario the congestion problem occurs due to diffused packets from malicious and legitimate nodes. Here the main aim is to show how our novel scheme in the second and third scenarios effectively controls the congestion problem by detecting and blocking malicious nodes, the result of which is increasing packet delivery of legitimate nodes. In the first scenario CCTF was not practically used for detecting and blocking malicious nodes, therefore, packet drop rate was about 20-30 in the interval of 0.1 s, and malfunctioning nodes contributed greatly to provoke the congestion problem. In the second scenario CCTF was applied and 50% of all the scattered nodes were randomly selected to operate as fuzzified form, therefore, up to 53.75% of malicious nodes were detected and blocked. The result was a reduction in the drop rate, close to 20%. In third scenario we guarded all nodes by proposed scheme. Therefore, up to 96.25% of the malicious nodes were detected. This action removed 88.7% of the traffic overhead ratio of malicious nodes and reduced the dropped packets ratio by close to 40%.
Figure 6
Dropped packet rate with and without isolating malicious nodes using fuzzy based scheme when 16% of all nodes are malicious Figure 7 depicts capability of CCTF scheme in detecting suspicious nodes. By increasing the number of fuzzified nodes, the number of detected malicious nodes increases. By simulating different scenarios an interesting result was achieved; for detecting a high percentage of malicious nodes, all sensor nodes need not necessarily be equipped with CCTF. Each node in the network is capable of monitoring the behaviour of its surrounding areas; therefore, a supervisor node X which senses carriers and attends virtual channel realises that some other neighbours do not cooperate with each other. For example node Y attempts to send packets through node Z, but the node Z is selfish and drops the received packets or re-forwards them several times. Consequently the node X will consider the node Z as a malicious node; however, no direct interaction between node X and Z is done. Based on this, when 68% of all sensor nodes used CCTF, up to 80% of all malicious nodes were detected. According to Figure 7 after 68% of fuzzification, curve inclination reduces; this is due to hard detection and non-uniform operation of remaining malicious nodes, therefore, it can be interpreted that when 68% of all nodes use our scheme, the number of detected malicious nodes is maximal and the sustained fuzzy based overhead ratio is minimal. In the first scenario 1% of all nodes are defined as malicious. In this situation, up to 48% of all malicious nodes were detected. With increase in the number of defined malicious nodes we expected that the number of detected malicious nodes increases. Figure 8 confirms our opinion and shows increment in both density and detection of malicious nodes. Therefore, up to 80% of all malicious nodes were detected when in the 16th scenario 16% of all nodes defined as malicious. Finally it can be seen that with defining 20% of all nodes as malicious up to 85% of them will be detected. We repeated all 20 scenarios and instead of 68%, all nodes were equipped with CCTF with highest overhead ratio. The simulation results showed that at least 96% of malicious nodes were detected. Therefore, when the number of malicious nodes is about 20% of all nodes the deference of detection between 68% fuzzification and 100% fuzzification is about 15%. It can be interpreted that when the high rate of nodes is malicious all nodes need not necessarily be equipped with CCTF. On the other hand when the number of malicious node is about 1% of all nodes, the deference of detection between 68% and 100% is almost 60%. CCTF increases received packets ratio of legitimate nodes by isolating malicious nodes and making them ineffective by dropping the related packets. Therefore, useless packets will be replaced with useful packets in the buffer, the result of which is increasing packet delivery of legitimate nodes. Figure 9 illustrates the most and least improvement packet delivery ratio based on the percentage of detected malicious nodes when all nodes were fuzzified. If a huge majority of the useful packets which were diffused by legitimate nodes do not endanger a drop in the subsequent hop(s), the received packet ratio is maximal. Each diffused packet will be delivered after passing all intermediate nodes from source to sink. Since the buffer capacity of the nodes is limited, the probability of buffer overflow and blinding drops. This trend is, unfortunately, undeniable because of the congestion phenomenon. The goal of using CCTF is to increase useful packet ratio delivery. When the majority of useful packet drops, not only does using CCTF in previous hop(s) become ineffective, the forced energy overhead of CCTF also helps to waste the battery reserve of former nodes. In this situation the received packet delivery is minimal. The presence of malicious nodes in dense regions causes higher interaction with legitimate nodes in comparison with sparse regions; consequently, a huge amount of useless packet may diffuse suddenly. Therefore, the minimum and maximum improvement in packet delivery of legitimate nodes depends on the placement and interaction of malicious nodes with legitimate nodes. Under the best circumstances, our fuzzy based scheme could increase received packet ratio of about 27.5% in the presence of the congestion problem when 16% of all nodes are detected as malicious. When the interaction of nodes is continuously repeated over a greater time, burst data may provoke buffer overflow, due, in part, to cooperation in the propagation of new detected phenomena. Therefore, some useful and important information may be dropped before delivery. By blocking malicious nodes and their related overhead ratio, the delivery chance of useful packet will be increased dramatically. Figure 10 shows packet delivery comparison when 68% and 100% of all nodes have been equipped with CCTF. The amount of malicious nodes was defined as 3%, 5%, 8% and 16%. When 3% of all nodes are malicious, the results show that maximum deference between 68% and 100% fuzzification in the improvement of packet delivery will be obtained (41.35%). On the other hand when the number of malicious nodes increases, the deference will be decreased and large amount of malicious nodes will be detected simply. By defining 5%, 8% and 16% of all nodes as malicious the deference in the improvement of packet delivery will be 35.5%, 29.5% and 19.7%, respectively. This decrement in difference of packet delivery is because of the increment in dropping of useless packets. Therefore, when the number of malicious nodes is large enough, acceptable result will be achieved with lower forced overhead ratio of CCTF.
Figure10
The comparisons of received packet ratio while all nodes or only 68% of all nodes have been fuzzified. 3%, 5%, 8% or 16% of all nodes defined as malicious
As explained in Section 1; computation is typically much less energy consuming than communication. The forced energy overhead of CCTF can be impressed by the network situation. In terms of minimum rate or no existence of malicious node(s) the overhead ratio is maximal. Each fuzzified node monitors all neighbour nodes by using energy but no malicious node(s) will be detected. Therefore, much energy will be wasted. On the other hand not only do large numbers of malicious nodes exist, they also diffuse useless, duplicative, delayed or irrelevant packets without considering suitable interval or routing protocol policies. Thus they tend to decrease buffer capacity of neighbour nodes. Moreover, triggering simultaneous and duplicative packets forwarded by a large group of malicious nodes to a common sink provokes congestion problems and many of the useful packets will be dropped. Furthermore, many of the relevant nodes cooperate in forwarding useless packets blindly and waste a considerable amount of energy. Thus, instead of forwarding useless packets, trying to detect and block malicious nodes with our proposed new solution will be a better way to increase network efficiency.
Conclusion
Using fuzzy logic in WSNs, a new scheme for the congestion control protocol based on trustworthiness of nodes was presented. The new scheme (CCTF) enables the sensor nodes to investigate the behaviour of their neighbours. By isolating malfunctioning nodes, their forced overhead ratio will be reduced due to blocking useless packets. CCTF improves the trustworthiness and also prevents sensor nodes from wasting their battery energy which is expended for interaction with many malicious nodes. The simulation results of CCTF show 27.5% increase in received packet ratio, and 40% decrease in packet drop ratio when 16% of WSN nodes are inferred as malicious.
